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This paper presents a behavioral finance model of the exchange rate. Agents forecast the 
exchange rate by means of very simple rules. They can choose between three groups of 
forecasting rules: fundamentalist, extrapolative and momentum rules. Agents using a 
fundamentalist rule are not able to observe the true value of the fundamental exchange and 
therefore have to rely on an estimate of this variable to make a forecast. Based on simulation 
analysis we find that two types of equilibria exist, a fundamental and a non-fundamental one. 
Both the probability of finding a particular type of equilibrium and the probability of 
switching between different types of equilibria depend on the number of rules available to 
agents. Furthermore, we find that the exchange rate dynamics is sensitive to initial conditions 
and to the risk perception about the underlying fundamental. Both results are dependent on 
the number of forecasting rules. 
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During the last few years, models of the exchange market have increasingly departed from the
rational expectations e¢ cient market paradigm. The main reason for this departure is the
poor empirical performance of models based on that paradigm. This has led to new modelling
approaches that start from the fact that agents experience cognitive problems preventing
them from understanding the complexity of the world (Frankel and Froot(1990), Brock and
Hommes(1998), Lux and Marchesi(1998), Brunnermeier(2001), Kirman and TheyssiŁre(2002),
De Grauwe and Grimaldi(2005), Lux and Schorstein(2005)). As a result, agents rely on sim-
ple behavioral rules (heuristics) that incorporate only small bits of the total information set.
In this paper we follow this recent trend and we re￿ne some previous modelling approaches.
The new modelling approach in which agents have imperfect information, maintains the
notion of rationality. Rationality, however, is to be understood as an evolutionary selection
mechanism. Instead of de￿ning it as the capacity to understand the complexity of the world,
as is done in rational expectations models, we use the notion of rationality as a mechanism
whereby agents evaluate their past decisions according to a "￿tness" criterion and revise
those as new information becomes available. This way of understanding rationality comes
closer to the view that utility has not only an ex-ante component which drives agents in
their process of making decisions, but it also refers to the hedonic experience associated with
an outcome as stressed by Kahneman and Thaler(2006). In order to maximize their utility,
fully rational individuals need to be able to make precise and unbiased forecasts of hedonic
outcomes of alternative choices. As these authors show, this condition is not always satis￿ed.
On the contrary, individuals often make systematic errors in predicting the utility they will
obtain from future outcomes. As a consequence they will repeatedly miss the objective of
maximizing (experienced) utility. Since agents make systematic mistakes when forecasting
the utility of future outcomes they are obliged to revise their decision so as to maximize
utility. But agents can only know ex-post whether their choice increased their utility or not.
If it did not, they will correct their decision. Thus, rationality is to be understood as an
evolutionary process. We apply this notion of rationality in this paper by allowing agents to
use simple behavioral rules to forecast the exchange rate. If a particular rule does not pass a
2￿tness (pro￿tability) test, agents will switch to another rule in order to obtain greater ￿tness
(return).1
The objective of this paper is twofold. We analyze how increasing the number of fore-
casting rules available to agents a⁄ects the dynamics of the exchange rate. In addition, we
assume that agents are not able to observe the underlying value of the fundamental exchange
rate. They face uncertainty about this variable and therefore they need to estimate it. Our
results can be summarized as follows. First, two types of equilibria are found, a fundamental
and a non-fundamental (bubble) one. Whether the exchange rate is in a fundamental or in a
non-fundamental equilibrium is determined by stochastic disturbances. The number of fore-
casting rules does not a⁄ect this ￿nding. Second, the exchange rate dynamics is sensitive to
initial conditions. Initial disturbances have a large impact on the path of the exchange rate.
When agents have many rules to chose from this sensitivity to initial conditions disappears.
Third, once a particular equilibrium has been reached, the probability of switching to an-
other equilibrium depends on the number of rules. Fourth, we ￿nd that the uncertainty (risk
perception) about the fundamental exchange rate is important in the determining the path
of the exchange rate. Fourth, we ￿nd that the exchange rate series presents excess volatility.
Fifth, for certain combinations of parameter values we ￿nd that the exchange rate is dom-
inated by chaos dynamics. The range, though, for which we are able to ￿nd this chaothic
behavior is rather small. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we
present the theoretical model. In sections 3 and 4 we analyze the characteristics of the model
in a stochastic environment. The features of the model in a deterministic environment are
analyzed in section 5. In section 6 we study the sensitivity to initial conditions and in section
7 we investigate the relevance of the uncertainty about the fundamental exchange rate. We
conclude in section 8
2 Theoretical exchange rate model
The model presented in this section is an extension of the model developed by De Grauwe
and Grimaldi (2005). We extend this model in two directions. First, instead of assuming
1This approach is akin to the idea of bounded rationality. See Simon(1957), Sargent(1993) and
Thaler(1994).
3that agents can only choose among two forecasting rules, we now assume that they can select
among N di⁄erent rules. Second, we drop the assumption that agents who use a fundamen-
talist rule know the value of the underlying fundamental exchange rate with certainty. Here
we assume that they face uncertainty about this fundamental value. The rest of the model
has the same structure as in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005). There is a constant number of
agents, each one of them choosing an optimal portfolio consisting of a domestic and a foreign
asset. The only uncertainty in this choice comes from the unknown future developments of
the exchange rate. Every agent makes a forecast of the future exchange rate by means of
a "rule of thumb" forecasting rule at the beginning of the period. After each period, all
agents evaluate their ex-ante choice of selecting a particular forecasting rule using a ￿tness
criterion, i.e. by comparing the realized (ex-post) risk adjusted return delivered by this rule
with the average (ex-post) risk adjusted returns obtained with the alternative rules. If the
￿tness criterion does not favour the use of the rule anymore agents switch to a "￿tter" rule.
2.1 The optimal portfolio
We assume agents of di⁄erent types k depending on their beliefs about the future exchange
rate. Each agent can invest in two assets, a domestic (risk-free) asset and a foreign (risky)













t+1 is the wealth of an agent using rule of type k to forecast the exchange rate for
period t+1, Et is the expectation operator, ￿ is the coe¢ cient of risk aversion and V k(W k
t+1)
represents the conditional variance of wealth of agent using rule k, and k = 1;::K.2 The
wealth dynamics is governed by:
W
k
t+1 = (1 + r
￿)st+1d
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where r and r￿ are respectively the domestic and the foreign interest rates (which are known
with certainty), st+1 is the exchange rate at time t + 1, dk;t represents the holdings of the
foreign assets by agent using rule type k at time t. Thus, the ￿rst term on the right-hand
2The functional form of the di⁄erent forecasting rules will be speci￿ed in the next section.
4side of equation 2 represents the value of the (risky) foreign portfolio expressed in domestic
currency at time t + 1 while the second term represents the value of the (riskless) domestic
portfolio at time t + 1.3
Substituting equation 2 in 1 and maximizing the utility with respect to dk;t allows us to









k;t = (1 + r￿)2V k
t (st+1): The optimal holding of the foreign asset depends on the
expected excess return (corrected for risk) of the foreign asset. The market demand for
foreign assets at time t is the sum of the individual demands, i.e.:
K X
k=1
nk;tdk;t = Dt (4)
where nk;t is the number of agents using rule of type k at period t.
Market equilibrium implies that the market demand is equal to the market supply Zt
which we assume to be exogenous.5 Thus,
Zt = Dt (5)
Substituting the optimal holdings into the market demand and then into the market equi-































3The model could be interpreted as an asset pricing model with one risky asset (e.g. shares) and a risk
free asset. Equation (2) would then be written as
Wi
t+1 = (st+1 + yt+1)di






where st+1is the price of the share in t+1 and yt+1is the dividend per share in t+1.
4If the model is interpreted as an asset pricing model of one risky asset (shares) and a risk free asset, the







5The market supply is determined by the net current account and by the sales or purchases of foreign
exchange of the central bank. We assume both to be exogenous here. In De Grauwe and Grimaldi 2006 a
model with endogenized current account is presented.
5Thus the market clearing exchange rate is determined by the forecasts of the agents, Ek
t ,
about the future exchange rate. Note also that the forecasts are weighted by their respective
variances ￿2
k;t. When agents￿k forecasts have a high variance the weight of these agents in
the determination of the market exchange rate is reduced. In the following we will set r = r￿:
2.2 Forecasting rules
Agents can choose between K di⁄erent rules to forecast the exchange rate. We distinguish
between three classes of rules: fundamental, extrapolative and momentum rules. There
are respectively F, C and M versions of fundamental, extrapolative and momentum rules.
Therefore:
K = (f1 + f2 + ::: + fF) + (c1 + c2 + ::: + cC) + (m1 + m2 + ::: + mM) (7)
where fi;ci and mi stand for the i-th version of the fundamentalist, chartist and momen-
tum rules respectively.
Fundamentalists6 make their forecasts by comparing the market exchange rate with the
fundamental value of the exchange rate. As mentioned earlier, they do not know the funda-
mental value with certainty, however. As a result, agents have to rely on an estimate of this
variable. The forecasting rule for fundamentalists is therefore given by:
E
fi








fi;t￿1 is fundamentalist￿ s i estimate of the value of the fundamental exchange rate
in period t ￿ 1, and 0 <   < 1. Even though agents using a fundamentalist rule have
heterogeneous estimates of the value of the fundamental exchange rate, they all use a mean
reverting rule to forecast the exchange rate. Put di⁄erently, if an agent using fundamen-
talist rule k observes that the market exchange rate exceeds (is below) his estimate of the
fundamental, s￿
fi;t￿1; she will expect the market exchange rate to decline (increase) towards
the "fundamental" next period. The parameter   expresses the percentage of the estimated
misalignment (i.e. st￿1 ￿ s￿
fi;t￿1) expected to be corrected next period. Note that as since
agents may have di⁄erent estimates of the fundamental exchange rate, they will tend to take
6We use the term "fundamentalist" in a loose sense. It is an agent whos chooses to use a fundamentalist
forecasting rule.
6opposite positions when the exchange rate does not move too far from the true fundamental.
We show the way in which agents form their estimates of the fundamental exchange rate
in the following section. The (unobserved true) fundamental exchange rate is assumed be
driven by a random walk process.7
We de￿ne two types of chartist forecasting rules. The ￿rst one is an extrapolating rule
while the second one a momentum rule. The extrapolating rule consists in extrapolating the
past changes of the exchange rate into the future. It takes the following simple form:
E
ci
t [￿st+1] = ￿ci￿st￿1 (9)
where ￿ci is the extrapolating parameter used by chartist ci.
The second, is a momentum rule to forecast the exchange rate. It consists in ￿rst com-
puting the di⁄erence between a short-term and a long-term moving average of past observed
values of the market exchange rate. If the short-term moving average is larger (smaller) than













(st￿1 + st￿2::: + st￿NL)
NL
(12)
are the short-term and long-term moving averages and NS < NL
Finally, equation 6 also depends on the risk of investing in the foreign portfolio. Risk is
de￿ned as the variance of the one period ahead forecast errors made by the agents. Since
7To check for robustness we also allowed in some simulation the fundamental to follow a mean reverting
(AR) process. Since the results under both de￿nitions of the fundamental were not di⁄erent we decided to
maintin our original assumption of a random walk process driving the fundamemtal.




















t [st+1] ￿ st+1)
2 (15)
2.2.1 Fitness of the rules
The next step in our analysis is to specify how agents evaluate the ￿tness of their forecasting
rules. The general idea that we follow here is that agents choose one of the available rules,
then compare ex post the (risk adjusted) returns of this rule with the alternatives, after
which they decide whether to keep the rule or switch to another one. Thus, as motivated in
the introduction, our model is in the logic of evolutionary dynamics. Agents make a choice
ex-ante. Once the outcome of their choice is observable they evaluate whether their choice
produced a higher pro￿t than the benchmark pro￿t. When this is not the case agents revise
their decisions and switch to a to a more pro￿table forecasting rule.
In order to implement this idea we use the approach proposed by Brock and Hommes(1997)
which consists in making the weights of the forecasting rules a function of the relative (risk





























8Here we implicitly assume that agents remember only the risk associated with the last period￿ s decision.
A memory parameter can be easily added in order to allow agents to have a longer memory horizon. In De
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), for instance, agents￿memory is the weighted average of all past variances and
the weights are assumed to decay exponentially, i.e. agents attach a higher weight to recent mistakes and
lower weight to mistakes that lie further in the past.
9This speci￿cation of the decision rule is often used in discrete choice models. For an application in the
market for di⁄erentiated products see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse(1992). The idea has also been applied


















mi;t are the risk adjusted net returns made by the use of the di⁄erent







Equations 16 , 17 and 18 can be interpreted as switching rules. When the risk adjusted
return of a particular rule increases relative to the risk adjusted return obtained from the
other rules (the denominator), then the share of agents who use that rule increases, and vice
versa. The motivation to use such a switching mechanism is the following: agents observe
their environment and react to economic variables by adjusting their behavior with a certain
probability that is a function of those economics variables. In our model, the economic
variable that drives these changes in agents￿behavior is the ex-post (risk-adjusted) return of
their investment in the foreign exchange market. The parameter ￿ measures the intensity
with which agents revise their forecasting rules. With an increasing ￿ agents react strongly
to the relative returns of the rules. In the limit when ￿ goes to in￿nity all agents choose the
forecasting rule which proves to be the most pro￿table. When ￿ is equal to zero agents are
insensitive to the relative return of the rules. Thus, ￿ is a measure of inertia in the decision
to switch to the more pro￿table rule.10 As will be seen, this parameter is of great importance
in generating bubbles.
We de￿ne the return as the one-period return of investing 1$ in the foreign asset. More
formally,
￿k;t = [st (1 + r












1 for x > 0
0 for x = 0
￿1 for x < 0
and k = 1:::K
Thus, when agents forecasted an increase in the exchange rate and this increase is realized,
their per unit pro￿t is equal to the observed increase in the exchange rate (corrected for the
interest di⁄erential). If instead the exchange rate declines, they make a per unit loss which
10The psychological literature reveals that there is a lot of evidence of a ￿ status quo bias￿ in decision
making (see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler(1991). This implies ￿ < 1: Thus we set 0 < ￿ < 1:
9equals this decline (because in this case they have bought foreign assets which have declined
in price).
We use a concept of return instead of pro￿ts for two reasons. First, our switching rules
of equations 17, 16 and 18 select the ￿ttest rules. It does not select agents. Second, in our
de￿nition of returns agents only have to use publicly available information, i.e. the forecasting
rules and the observed exchange rate changes. They do not have to know their competitor￿ s
pro￿ts. Furthermore, the pro￿t obtained by taking a certain position are a function of the
amount invested which is not public knowledge in our model. Here we assume that every
agent invests only $1 and therefore the pro￿ts are to be interpreted as the percentage return
obtained by taking a particular position.
3 Stochastic simulation of the model
The strong non-linearities make it di¢ cult to characterize the equilibrium and the dynamics
of the model in an analytical way. Therefore, we use simulation techniques which we will
present in this and the following sections. We select "reasonable" values of the parameters,
i.e. those that come close to empirically observed values. However, we will analyze how
sensitive the solution is to di⁄erent sets of parameter values in the following section.
We start by presenting simulations in the time domain. We concentrate ￿rst on how the
number of forecasting rules a⁄ects the equilibrium and the dynamics around the equilibrium.
At the start of each simulation half of the agents choose a fundamentalist rules and half
choose a chartist rule (either extrapolative or momentum rule). Since the fundamental value
is not known with certainty each agent using a fundamentalist rule estimates the value
of the underlying fundamental. The estimates of the fundamental are given by a normally
distributed random sequence with mean equal to the true fundamental (which varies at every
period t due to the fact that the fundamental is driven by a random walk process) and with
variance equal to ￿2
fund. In section 7 we analyze the importance of parameter ￿2
fund which is
a measure of the uncertainty about the true underlying fundamental. Unless it is otherwise
indicated we assume that this variance takes the value of 1. The fundamental estimates as
well as the fundamental itself are generated before every simulation begins.
Agents using an extrapolative rule or a momentum rule choose a value for ￿ei and ￿mj
10that is taken from within the following bounds: ￿ei 2 [0:5;1:0], ￿mj 2 [0:25;0:5]. Values of
￿ei > 1 and ￿mj > 0:5 produce unstable results. In section 5 we perform a sensitivity analysis
with respect to these parameter values. Agents are allowed to switch between these di⁄erent
rules depending on their relative pro￿tabilities as speci￿ed in equations 16 , 17 and 18.
We show the results for two di⁄erent values of the number of rules N, i.e. N=4 (Figure
1a and 1b) and N=200 (Figure 2a and 2b).11 The main feature of these simulations is that
the exchange rate movements are characterized by the existence of two regimes.
Figure 1: Simulations in the time domain with N=4
1a 1b
The ￿rst regime is one during which the exchange rate moves within a close band around
the fundamental given by the beliefs (estimates) of agents about the fundamental exchange
rate; the second regime is characterized by movements that are disconnected from the fun-
damental. The former regime coincides with a situation where both chartists and fundamen-
talists rules are used (see right hand side panel of ￿gures 1 and 2 which shows the weights of
chartist and fundamentalist rules), while the second regime coincides with a situation where
only chartist rules are used. In appendix A we show that the model generates two types
of equilibria, a fundamental and a non-fundamental one. The non-fundamental equilibrium
is one where fundamentalist rules are not used, and only chartist rules are employed. This
equilibrium arises because when certain stochastic shocks arise, chartist rules can become
11We only show the belief of 5 fundamentalists when agents can choose between 5 or more fundamentalist
rules.
11Figure 2: Simulations in the time domain with N=100
2a 2b
very pro￿table, thereby inducing agents who use fundamentalist rules to switch to chartist
rules. This then reinforces the pro￿tability of the latter rules, inducing more switches. A self-
ful￿lling dynamics is created in which the exchange rate is attracted to a non-fundamental
equilibrium, which can also be called a bubble equilibrium.12 The latter, however, is only
locally stable. Su¢ ciently strong shocks in the fundamental will attract the exchange rate
towards the fundamental equilibrium. This feature of the model creates movements of the
exchange rate around the fundamental whereby the exchange rate appears to be disconnected
from its fundamental value much of the time. We found a similar result in De Grauwe and
Grimaldi(2005) when only two types of rules were allowed. Thus the existence of two types
of equilibria, a fundamental and a non-fundamental one, continues to hold when the number
of rules is expanded beyond 2.
4 Sensitivity analysis in a stochastic environment
In this section we report on experiments that aim to ￿nd out how robust the previous results
are. We want to check the sensitivity of the results to particular parameter values, and to
the size of shocks. We performed simulations in the time domain (10,000 periods) for many
12It should be stressed that this de￿nition of a bubble is very di⁄erent from the ￿ rational bubble￿which
is de￿ned as an unstable path of the exchange rate. It comes closer to the notion of ￿ sunspots￿which is also
an equilibrium concept in rational expectations models (see Blanchard and Fischer(1989), p255).
12di⁄erent parameter values and sizes of initial shocks. We dropped the ￿rst 4,000 observations
in order to eliminate the transient e⁄ects of the initial shock itself. We counted the number
of times the model produces a non-fundamental (bubble) equilibrium. The latter is de￿ned
as a situation in which the share of agents using a fundamentalist rule is zero (more precisely
was smaller or equal to 2￿52 ) . Each simulation with a given value of parameter ￿ and initial
shock, is repeated 100 times.
The probability of ￿nding a bubble, conditional on the values the di⁄erent parameters
beta, gama and the shock to initial conditions, is obtained by computing the average of
the percentage of times that bubbles occur in each of the 100 simulations. We collect these
numbers in ￿gure 3a (2 fundamentalist and 2 chartist rules) and ￿gure 3b (100 fundamentalist
and 100 chartist rules). The vertical axis shows the percentage of time the exchange rate is
in a bubble equilibrium. The x-axis shows the initial disturbance given to the exchange rate;
the y-axis shows di⁄erent values of the parameter ￿ (which measures the intensity agents
switch to a di⁄erent rule when pro￿tability changes).
We obtain broadly similar results whether we have two rules or many rules. This can be
seen by comparing ￿gures 3a and 3b. When both ￿ and the shock to initial conditions are
close to zero, bubbles do not occur. This is a world in which agents do not switch. In such a
world the exchange rate remains close to its fundamental value. We note though that in the
case of many rules the area of fundamental equilibria is larger. This suggests that we need
larger shocks to produce non-fundamental equilibria when agents scan choose among many
rules that when they choose among two rules only.
As ￿ increases, i.e. agents are increasingly willing to switch to more pro￿table rules, the
probability of obtaining bubbles increases. This result holds both when agents choose among
few or many rules.
5 Sensitivity analysis in a deterministic environment.
In this section we analyze the nature of the equilibria of the model when the stochastic shocks
are zero. This deterministic version of the model allows us to shed some additional light on
the nature of the two types of equilibria uncovered in the previous section. In order to do
so, we set all exogenous stochastic variables equal to zero, and normalized the fundamental
13Figure 3: Probabilities of ￿nding bubbles
3a
3b
14value of the exchange rate at 0. We then simulated the model giving di⁄erent initial shocks
to the exchange rate and di⁄erent values to ￿;￿c or ￿m. We ran these simulations over 10000
periods in order to analyze if the exchange rate converges to its equilibrium. This can be either
a fundamental equilibrium or a non-fundamental (bubble) equilibrium. In the former case
the exchange rate converges to zero (which is the value given to the constant fundamental
value). In the case of a bubble equilibrium the exchange rate converges to a positive or
negative number. In this case all agents use chartist rules, and nobody uses fundamentalist
rules. We show the results of these experiments in ￿gures 4 to 6. On the vertical axis we
set out the equilibrium value of the exchange rate (obtained from simulations in the time
domain). On the x-axis we present the initial shock of the exchange rate, and on the y-axis
the di⁄erent values of a speci￿c parameter (￿ in ￿gure 4, ￿e in ￿gure 5 and ￿m in ￿gure
6). The results show that for small initial shocks the exchange rate always converges to its
fundamental value. This is made clear from the fact that all the equilibrium exchange rates
are located on a plane that cuts the vertical axis at the value of zero.
Figure 4: Deterministic simulation: sensitivity to gama and initial conditions
4a 4b
We also observe that as the parameters ￿; ￿e, and ￿m increase, the number of non-
fundamental equilibria increases. This is shown by the collection of positive and negative
points. Each of these points represents a non-fundamental equilibrium to which the exchange
rate converges when the initial shock and the parameters ￿; ￿e,and ￿m are su¢ ciently large.
Notice that when these parameters increase in value the initial shock that will lead to a
15Figure 5: Deterministic simulations: sensitivity to beta-extrapolative and initial
conditions with 2 fundamentalists and 2 chartists
5a 5b
Figure 6: Deterministic simulations: sensitivity to beta-momentum and initial
conditions with 100 fundamentalists and 100 chartists
6a 6b
16bubble equilibrium becomes smaller. Note also that the border between fundamental and
non-fundamental equilibria is discontinuous. We will show that it has a fractal nature, which
leads to "sensitivity to initial conditions". We will return to this feature in section 6.
As can be seen from comparing the left and right panels of ￿gures 4 to 6 the results are
broadly similar in the two cases of few and many rules. However, the planes collecting the
fundamental equilibria tend to be larger when agents have a choice among many rules, rather
than two. This con￿rms our result of the previous section indicating that one needs larger
shocks to trigger a bubble when agents use many rules than when they use only a few.
It should also be noted that a non-fundamental equilibrium can only exist and be model
consistent if nobody uses fundamentalist forecasting rules in equilibrium. Suppose the con-
trary, i.e. the exchange rate has converged to a constant non-fundamental equilibrium while
some agents continue to use a fundamentalist rule. In this case these agents would be fore-
casting an increase (or a decline) in the exchange rate. Since in equilibrium the exchange rate
is constant these agents would make a permanent and perfectly predictable forecast error.
The model excludes this as an equilibrium outcome. The ￿tness criterion ensures that such
a rule will not be used.
6 Sensitivity to initial conditions
The fractal nature of the boundary between fundamental and non-fundamental equilibria
creates the potential for sensitivity to initial conditions. This implies that a very small
di⁄erence in the initial disturbance to the exchange rate can lead to a di⁄erent time path
of the exchange rate for long periods of time. We analyze the existence of sensitivity to
initial conditions by repeating two times a simulation of the model in the time domain while
assuming exactly the same realization of the fundamental exchange rate and beliefs about
the fundamental exchange rate, as well as the same random shock to the market exchange
rate. The only di⁄erence between the two simulations is the fact that the initial exchange
rate is given a very small di⁄erent value. We show the results of this experiment in ￿gure 7.
We ￿nd that when the number of rules is small the exchange rate is extremely sensitive to
initial conditions while when the number of rules is large this feature disappears and the two
exchange rate series coincide perfectly. The rationale for this result is that when there are
17Figure 7: Sensitivity to initial conditions in the time domain
7a 7b
Figure 8: Sensitivity to initial conditions: percentage of times initial conditions
generate di⁄erent paths of the exchange rate
8a 8b
18fewer rules to choose from the discontinuities in the switching process are more pronounced.
These discontinuities are at the core of the sensitivity to initial conditions feature.
In order to be sure that this result is robust we repeated the same experiment many times
for di⁄erent values of parameter ￿. In each simulation we counted the number of times the
deviation between the two exchange rates exceeded a treshold value which we set at 1. Every
simulation with a given combination of ￿ and shock to initial condition was repeated 100
times over 10,000 periods. We eliminate the ￿rst 4,000 thousand observations eliminate the
transient e⁄ect of the initial shock itself. We show the results in ￿gure 8. The horizontal
axis shows the value of parameter ￿. Each point on the vertical axis shows the percentage
of times the two exchange rates realizations deviated by more than the threshold value. We
observe that when agents have many rules to choose from, the two exchange rates series are
perfectly aligned, i.e. the sensitivity to initial conditions disappears. Since the number of
rules available to agents is larger the discontinuities in the switches become less pronounced.
Put di⁄erently, the probability of jumping (switching) between regimes is lower when agents
have many rules to choose from.
Figure 9: Percentage of times the exchange rate entered or left a bubble
9a 9b
In ￿gure 9 we present this in more detail where the probability of entering or leaving
a bubble equilibrium is shown. We simulated the model in the time domain over 10,000
periods for a given initial shock (-8) while letting ￿ increase.13 After eliminating the ￿rst
13This value was arbitrarily chosen. The conculssions, however, do not depend on this particular initial
194,000 thousand observations we computed the average number of times that the exchange
rate moved into and out of a bubble equilibrium. The same experiment was repeated 100
times and then the average over this 100 repetitions was computed. By comparing ￿gure 9a
and 9b it is possible to see that the probability of entering and leaving a bubble increases
with gama. When agents can choose between few rules (￿gure 9a), though, this probability
is considerably higher compared to a situation where agents have many rules (￿gure 9b).
In the latter case discreteness of switches between alternative forecasting rules becomes less
pronounced due to the larger choice of rules available to agents. As a consequence the number
of times the exchange rate enters and/or leaves a particular equilibrium is lower the larger
the number of rules available to agents.
7 Uncertainty about the fundamental
Agents who use a fundamentalist forecasting rule face the uncertainty about the true value
of the underlying fundamental value of the exchange rate. It is important to analyze how
this uncertainty a⁄ects the model and the dynamics of the exchange rate. We analyze this
issue now.
As will be remembered fundamentalists estimate the underlying fundamental. The way
we proceed here is to assume di⁄erent levels of precision with which agents estimate the
true fundamental. We do this by varying the standard deviation of the distribution of the
estimated fundamental around the true value while leaving the random shock as well as the
initial shock to the observed exchange rate unchanged. Thus when agents feel less con￿dent
about their estimate of the fundamental exchange rate, the standard deviation increases. We
show the e⁄ect of increasing the standard deviation in the time domain in ￿gures 10a and
10b. In 10a the standard deviation is low (std=1), in 10b it is high (std=3).14
The most surprising aspect of the results of ￿gures 10a and 10b is the extreme sensitivity
of the exchange rate path with respect to the standard deviation. The simulations were run
in such a way that the stochastic realization of the true fundamental is exactly the same
shock and remain valid for other parameter values.
14We eliminate the ￿rst 3000 thousand observations because they are highly biased by the initial shock
to the exchange rate. Focusing at the remaining observations delivers a better insight about the path of the
exchange rate independent of this shock.
20Figure 10: Sensitivity to the variance of the estimate of the fundamental with few
rules
10a 10b
Figure 11: Sensitivity to the variance of the estimate of the fundamental with
many rules
11a 11b
21in the two simulations as well as the stochastic shock to the observed exchange rate. The
only di⁄erence is in the standard deviation of the estimates of this fundamental made by
agents. We observe that the time path of the exchange rate is completely di⁄erent in the two
simulations although the underlying true fundamental is behaving in exactly the same way.
Thus uncertainty about the underlying fundamental has a strong e⁄ect on the course of the
exchange rate movements.
As can be seen from ￿gures 11a and 11b, we obtain a similar result when agents have a
choice between many rules (100 fundamentalist and 100 chartist rules). Also in this situation
we ￿nd that the exchange rate path crucially depends on the uncertainty agents have about
the true value of the fundamental exchange rate. We note however that when the uncertainty
is low (￿gure 11a) the exchange rate remains in a close neighborhood of the fundamental.
This was not the case when the number of forecasting rules to choose from is small (see ￿gure
10a).
Another interesting feature that is present in our results is that the volatility of the
observed exchange rate is substantially higher than the volatility of the fundamental exchange
rate. Thus our results mimick the empirical regularity of excess volatility. We also ￿nd
though that when the number of rules is large and when there is little uncertainty about
the underlying fundamental the excess volatility is less pronounced. The intuition behind
this result is the same as in the previous section. When there are more rules available to
agents the discontinuities in the switches are attenuated. As a consequence large jumps in
the exchange rate are less frequent.
8 Conclusion
The rational expectations revolution has dominated macroeconomics and exchange rate mod-
elling during the last three decades. Things are changing, though. As a result of the poor
empirical performance of the exchange rate models based on rational expectations, the use
of models that depart from rational expectations has become acceptable again.
In this paper we departed from the rational expectations paradigm. This does not mean,
however, that agents in our model are fools. The rational expectations paradigm has given
a very restrictive meaning to the concept of rationality. This is one in which agents are
22capable of understanding the incredible complexity of the world and are using this God-like
intellectual capacity to compute the implications of policy actions. We use a di⁄erent concept
of rationality. This is one in which agents realize that they cannot possibly understand the
"whole picture". As a result they use relatively simple rules (heuristics). Rationality comes
into play when these agents subject these rules ex post to a ￿tness (pro￿tability) test and
are willing to switch to the more pro￿table rule.
We used this framework and applied it to the foreign exchange market. We extended
previous analysis in two ways. First, we allowed agents to use many di⁄erent forecasting
rules, instead of just two. Second, we assumed that agents have imperfect knowledge of the
underlying fundamental. As a result, di⁄erent agents come up with di⁄erent estimates of the
fundamental exchange rate.
Our results con￿rm the existence of two types of equilibria, a fundamental and a non-
fundamental (bubble) one. The exchange rate switches from one equilibrium to the other
as a result of stochastic disturbances. This creates cyclical movements of the exchange rate
around the fundamental. This result is not sensitive to the number of forecasting rules among
which agents can choose.15
Secondly, we found that the exchange rate dynamics is sensitive to initial conditions. This
means that a small initial disturbance to the exchange rate can change its future time path
in a drastic way, creating new cycles that are not present without the initial disturbance.
However, we found that this result is sensitive to the number of forecasting rules agents can
choose from. We also ￿nd that the probability of switching between equilibria does depend
on the number of rules. Both results have to do with the fact that with a higher number of
rules the discontinuities in the switches between rules becomes less pronounced.
We also analyzed how uncertainty about the underlying fundamental exchange rate a⁄ects
the dynamics in the market. We found that when agents change the con￿dence they have
about their estimate of the fundamental exchange, the time path of the exchange rate is
a⁄ected strongly.
Finally, we our model produces excess volatility, a feature that has also been observed
15We stress that we have simulated the model with a maximum of 200 forecasting rules. This conclussion
might not necessarily apply if the number of rules is further increased.
23in real life data. The degree of excess volatility depends on the number of rules agents can
choose from and on the uncertainty they face about the underlying fundamental.
Appendix A: Solution of the model
In this appendix we investigate the properties of the solution of a simpli￿ed version of the
model in which we assume that there are only two forecasting rules, i.e. one fundamentalist
rule and one chartist (extrapolative rule).
The steady state
The non-linear structure of our model does not allow for a simple analytical solution. We set
Z = 0; and normalize the fundamental rate, s￿
t = s￿ = 0: We can then write equation 6 as
follows:


































Equations 13 and 14 de￿ning the variance terms can also be rewritten as follows:
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(25)
24Using the de￿nition of the forecasting rules 8 and 9, this yields
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f;t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿
2
f;t￿1 + ￿[(1 ￿  )st￿2 ￿ st￿1]
2 (27)
With suitable changes of variables it is possible to write the system as a 6-dimensional
system. Set
ut = st￿1
xt = ut￿1(= st￿2)
The 6 dynamic variables are (st;ut;xt;￿c;t;￿2
c;t;￿2
f;t). The state of the system at time
t ￿ 1, i.e. (st￿1; ut￿1; xt￿1; zt￿1; ￿c;t￿1; ￿2
c;t￿1; ￿2
f;t￿1) determines the state of the system at
time t, i.e. (st; ut; xt; ￿c;t; ￿2
c;t; ￿2
f;t) through the following 6-D dynamic system:
st = [1 + ￿ ￿ ￿f;t(  + ￿)]st￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿f;t)￿ut￿1 (28)
ut = st￿1 (29)
xt = ut￿1 (30)
￿c;t = (st ￿ st￿1) sgn [(ut￿1 + ￿(ut￿1 ￿ xt￿1) ￿ st￿1)(st ￿ st￿1)] (31)
￿
2
c;t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿
2




f;t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿
2



























25￿f;t￿1 = (st￿1 ￿ ut￿1)sgn [((1 ￿  )xt￿1 ￿ ut￿1)(st￿1 ￿ ut￿1)] (36)
It can now be shown that the model produces two types of steady state solutions. We
analyze these consecutively.
The exchange rate equals the fundamental value.
We normalize the fundamental to be zero. Thus, this solution implies that st = 0: As
a result, the variance terms go to zero. This also means that in the steady state, the risk
adjusted weights of the fundamentalists and chartists are of the form ￿f;t = 1
1 and ￿c;t = 1
1:
















One can show by numerical methods that in the steady state the expression ￿2
f;t=￿2
c;t
converges to 1.16 We show this in appendix 1 where we plot the ratio as a function of time.
This implies that in the steady state ￿f;t = wf;t and ￿c;t = wc;t .(Note that wf;t +wc;t = 1):














in the dynamic system (28)-(33).
There is a unique steady state where













i.e. the steady state is characterized by the exchange rate being at its fundamental level, by
zero pro￿ts and zero risk, and by fundamentalist and technical trader fractions equal to 1
2.
16It does not appear to be possible to show this by analytical methods.
26The exchange rate equals a non-fundamental value
The model allows for a second type of steady state solution. This is a solution in which the
exchange rate is constant and permanently di⁄erent from its (constant) fundamental value.
In other words the model allows for a constant non-zero exchange rate in the steady state.
The existence of such an equilibrium can be shown as follows. We use 20 and set st =
st￿1 = st￿2 = s; so that
￿￿f;t s = 0 (39)
It can now easily be seen that if ￿f;t = 0; any constant exchange rate will satisfy this
equation. From the de￿nition of ￿f;t we ￿nd that a su¢ cient condition for ￿f;t to be zero
is that ￿2
f;t = ￿2
f > 0; and ￿2
c;t = ￿2
c = 0. Note that in this case ￿c;t = 1 and ￿2
f =
 
2s2: Put di⁄erently, there exist ￿xed point equilibria in the steady state with the following
characteristics: the exchange rate deviates from the fundamental by a constant amount; thus,
fundamentalist forecasting rules lead to a constant error and therefore the risk adjusted share
of fundamentalist rules is zero.17 The latter is necessary, otherwise agents would still be using
the rule so that their forecast of a reversion to the fundamental would move the exchange
rate.
We will call this non-fundamental equilibrium a bubble equilibrium. We call it a bubble
equilibrium because it is an equilibrium in which fundamentalists exert no in￿ uence on the
exchange rate. It should be stressed that this de￿nition of a bubble is very di⁄erent from the
￿ rational bubble￿which is de￿ned as an unstable path of the exchange rate. It comes closer
to the notion of ￿ sunspots￿which is also an equilibrium concept in rational expectations
models (see Blanchard and Fischer(1989), p255).
With this dynamic system it is not possible to perform the local stability analysis of
the steady state with the usual techniques, based upon the analysis of the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state. The reason is that the ￿map￿whose
iteration generates the dynamics is not di⁄erentiable at the steady state (in fact the map is
not di⁄erentiable, for instance, on the locus of the phase-space of equation s = u, and the
17Note that this does not imply that the share of the fundamentalists, wf;t = 0 as can be seen from
equation (35).
27steady state belongs to this subset of the phase space).
Appendix B: Other equilibria
We have analyzed ￿xed point equilibria in the main text. These are obtained for a wide set of
plausible parameter values, but not for all. There are parameter values for which we obtain
periodic solutions instead of ￿xed points. There are also parameter values that generate more
complex solutions. We analyze these solutions in the present appendix.
Figure 12: Chaotic behavior: STMA = 5 - LTMA = 10
12a
















with 1 fundamentalist and 1 momentum chartist
 psi = -0.2; beta-momentum= 0.35; gama = 3
STMA = 5; LTMA = 10
12b
Figure 13: Chaotic behavior: STMA = 5 - LTMA = 15
13a


















with 1 fundamentalists and 1 momentum chartist
 psi = -0.2; beta-momentum= 0.16; gama = 3
STMA = 5; LTMA = 15
13b
28We ￿nd that some parameter values create the conditions for chaotic behavior. In general,
the range of parameter values that create chaos, however, is rather small. We show an example
of chaotic behavior in ￿gure 11a which shows the exchange rate in the time domain. We have
used the deterministic version of the model to create this simulation. We observe cyclical
movements around the fundamental. These movements are not the results of stochastics, as
all stochastics was eliminated from the model. In Figure 11b we show the strange attractor
corresponding to this simulation. As will be remembered, the strange attractor is the plot of
st and st￿1 (phase space representation). We observe that the exchange rate does not settle
to a ￿xed point but is contained into a "strange attractor". In ￿gures 12a and 12b we show
another example of complex dynamics both in the time domain and in the phase space.
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